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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK S. COOPER, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs, 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20,703 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JACK S. COOPER 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REV1EW 
Respondent c o n t e n d s t h a t t he i s s u e s for review by t h i s 
Court a r e a s fo l lows: 
1. Did the District Court er r in ru l ing that the 
appel lant was estopped from commencing foreclosure aga ins t the 
respondent after more than six years had elapsed from the time 
of sale of the proper ty , which gave the r ight to acceleration of 
the contract by vi r tue of the due-on-sale provision of the contract? 
2. Was the lender estopped from asser t ing the provi -
sions of the due-on-sale when the or ig inal borrower is once again 
the owner of the co l la te ra l , after borrower had foreclosed on the 
property and repurchased it at sale? 
3. Was the District Court authorized to award a t to r -
n e y ' s fees to the plaint iff-respondent? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The respondent , Jack S. Cooper, was the or ig ina l 
borrower from the appel lant in April of 1976, and a Trust Deed 
securing a loan was obtained from the respondent . The Trust 
Deed contained, among other t h ings , a non-assumption provis ion. 
In May of 1978, respondent sold, by Uniform Real 
Estate Contract , to one Gary Douglas Ford, t rus tee , the property 
securing a p p e l l a n t ' s loan to respondent . Tr ia l evidence indicated 
tha t a p p e l l a n t ' s file contained an insurance binder dated April , 
1979, showing Ford to be the owner of the p roper ty , thus put t ing 
appel lant on notice tha t the property had been sold. In addi t ion , 
a Notice of Interest had been filed with the Utah County Recorder. 
In January of 1982, Ford wrote to appel lant and complained of 
thei r th rea t to foreclose unless he agreed to pay a $3,000.00 
assumption fee and to pay increased interest (see Exhibit 18). 
This le t ter s t a t e s : 
"I acted in good faith by le t t ing you [Deseret 
Federal] know of the sa le" and "when I in i t i a l ly 
purchased the proper ty , I went into Orem (ups ta i r s ) 
office and was told by one of the officers (she was in 
charge of such th ings as assumptions) that it would 
be better to 'buy it on contract and then you won' t 
have to pay the assumption fee.1 She said that I 
would have to pay an assumption fee if I 'formally 
assumed the l o a n , ' but not if I buy it on cont rac t . 
'The company [Deseret Federal] i s n ' t going after the 
contract s a l e s . ' " 
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In June of 1981, the loan was d e l i n q u e n t . The a p p e l -
l a n t c l a ims to h a v e mai led a d u e - o n - s a l e no t ice to the r e s p o n d e n t . 
The r e s p o n d e n t den ie s h a v i n g r e c e i v e d the s a m e , a n d no proof 
of d e l i v e r y was i n t r o d u c e d a t t he time of t r i a l . I t was not u n t i l 
June 5, 1984, t h a t a Notice of Defaul t was f i l e d . 
In t he i n t e r i m , t he p r o p e r t y in ques t i on h a d been 
r e p o s s e s s e d by r e s p o n d e n t from F o r d . At t he time the Notice of 
Defaul t was f i l ed , the o r i g i n a l b o r r o w e r , the r e s p o n d e n t , was once 
a g a i n in pos se s s ion a n d the owner of the c o l l a t e r a l . 
T h u s , it was in excess of s i x y e a r s a f t e r the v i o l a t i o n 
of the d u e - o n - s a l e p r o v i s i o n before the a p p e l l a n t saw fit to f i le 
a Notice of Defau l t . I t i s r ecogn ized t h a t d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d 
Ford was in b a n k r u p t c y , w i th a s t a y in effect for v i r t u a l l y one 
y e a r . However, d u r i n g the r e m a i n i n g five y e a r s , the a p p e l l a n t 
was u n d e r no r e s t r a i n t a n d could have f i led a Notice of Defaul t 
a t a n y t ime . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A p p e l l a n t s t a t e s in i t s b r i e f t h a t the Di s t r i c t Court 
e r r e d in r u l i n g t h a t Deseret F e d e r a l must h a v e commenced fo rec lo -
s u r e of the sub jec t loan w i t h i n one y e a r a f t e r b e i n g informed of 
the v i o l a t i o n of the d u e - o n - s a l e c l a u s e u n d e r the T rus t Deed. 
This s t a t emen t i s not t r u e ; the Court made r e fe rence to a o n e -
y e a r p e r i o d , b u t such s t a t emen t i s mere ly d i c t a , i na smuch a s the 
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fact s i t u a t i o n shows t h a t such Notice of Defaul t was not com-
menced for a p e r i o d in exces s of s i x y e a r s a f t e r no t i f i c a t i on of 
the s a l e . 
I t is f u r t h e r a r g u e d t h a t t he Court h a d suf f ic ien t 
g r o u n d s u n d e r the c i r c u m s t a n c e s to a w a r d an a t t o r n e y ' s fee in 
b e h a l f of the r e s p o n d e n t . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I : DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN RULING 
THAT THE LENDER WAS ESTOPPED FROM 
COMMENCING FORECLOSURE AGAINST THE 
BORROWER, AFTER MORE THAN SIX YEARS 
HAD ELAPSED FROM THE TIME OF THE 
ACCELERATION OF THE DUE-ON-SALE PRO-
VISION OF THE BORROWER'S CONTRACT? 
The Uniform Commercial Code s p e c i f i c a l l y a d o p t s the 
p r i n c i p a l of e s toppe l u n d e r 70A-1-103, U.C.A. 1953, in which it is 
s t a t e d , 
"Unless d i s p l a c e d by the p a r t i c u l a r p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s 
a c t , t he p r i n c i p l e s of Taw and e q u i t y , i n c l u d i n g iaw 
m e r c h a n t a n d the law r e l a t i v e to c a p a c i t y to c o n t r a c t 
. . . e s t o p p e l . . .o r o t h e r v a l i d a t i n g or i n v a l i d a t i n g c l a u s e 
s h a l l supp lemen t i t s p r o v i s i o n s . 1 1 
I t is not a r g u e d t h a t the a p p e l l a n t d id not h a v e the 
l e g a l r i g h t to enforce t he d u e - o n - s a l e p r o v i s i o n b a s e d upon a n y 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e m i s e . The t h e o r y of the r e s p o n d e n t ' s c a s e is 
t h a t such ac t ion must be t a k e n w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t ime , or he 
is e s t o p p e d from en fo rc ing the p r o v i s i o n . 
A Utah c a s e which d e a l s wi th the a c c e l e r a t i o n of a 
c o n t r a c t is Will iamson v . W a n l a s s , 545 P . 2 d 1145, in which the 
Court he ld t h a t 
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"The imposition of a severe condition, such as 
a clause which allows for acceleration in case of 
defaul t , is not favored in the law, and one who seeks 
to impose such a condition must not, either by acts 
or omission, permit another to assume that the cove-
nant will not be s t r ic t ly enforced, and then 'crack 
down' on the obligor by r ig id ly ins is t ing on enforce-
ment without giving some reasonable notice and 
opportunity to comply. 
"Equitable claims or defenses may be asser ted 
and t r ied along with or aga ins t legal claims or 
defenses in the same action, and equi table pr inciples 
may be applied in an action at law. The pr inciples 
of equity and justice are un iversa l and apply wherever 
appropr ia te and necessary to enforce r igh ts or to 
prevent oppression and in jus t ice ." 
There are numerous cases in other jur isdict ions which 
support the proposition tha t due-on-sale acceleration c lauses , 
which give the mortgagee or note holder the option to declare the 
unpaid balance immediately due and payab le , are not self-
executing, and the option must be exercised before the provision 
becomes inopera t ive . If the acceleration provision does not specify 
any definite time in which the action to accelerate must be 
exercised, such election must be made within a reasonable time: 
69 ALR 3d, 713, 748; Walker Bank and Trust Co. v . Neilson 
(1971), 26 Utah 2d, 383, 490, P.2d 328; 55 Am.Jur. 2d, 
Mortgages, Section 373; Malouff v . Midland Federal Savings & 
Loan Association (1973), 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240; Mutual 
Federal Savings & Loan Association v . Wisconsin Wireworks (1973), 
58 Wise. 2d 99, 205 N.W.2d 762 (s ta t ing that the element of laches 
is a rguab ly present in this case where a land contract was 
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executed on April 26, 1967, and it was not unt i l more than two 
and one-half years l a t e r , on November 25, 1969, tha t the lender 
declared the balance due ) . Also see Mutual Federal Savings & 
Loan Association v . American Medical Services in 1974- Wise. 223, 
N.W.2d 921. This case upholds the defense of laches where the 
mortgagee had construct ive notice of a t ransfer and delayed four 
to six years in seeking to enforce the accelerat ion provision, 
dur ing which time interest ra tes had increased , which would 
prejudice the mortgagor. 
The Malouff case, sup ra , seems to be a landmark 
decision and is cited cont inua l ly . In tha t case , the Court, on 
page 1245, s ta ted 
"Malouff's contention was tha t this open-ended 
provision authorized an election to accelerate at any 
time, even years in the future. We do not ag ree . 
The p reva i l ing rule is that under an o rd inary accel-
erat ion clause in a mortgage or t rus t deed, the obligee 
has a reasonable time after the default or the event 
which gives r ise to the r ight to accelerate in which 
to declare the indebtedness due. Lovell v . Goss, 45 
Colo, 304, 101 P. 72; Washburn v . Williams, 10 
Colo.App. 153, 50 P . 223; 5 Am.Jur. 2d Mortgages, 
Section 384. Accordingly, where, as here , no definite 
time is specified by which the election to accelerate 
must be exercised, such election to do so must be made 
within a reasonable time. Here, the election to 
accelerate was made by Midland within a month after 
notice of Malouff s refusal to tender the payments 
requi red by the Assumption and Modification Agreement. 
Of course, each case must be considered on its own 
fac ts , and , ce r t a in ly , an election to accelerate a year 
or years in the future, as hypothesized by Malouff, 
could not be considered reasonable under o rd inary c i r -
cumstances ." 
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In the case of First Federal Savings & Loan v. P e r r y ' s 
Landing, 463 N.E.2d 636, an Ohio case , on page 648, the Court 
s ta tes 
fThe facts under lying the representat ion must 
be known to the pa r ty at the time he makes i t , or 
at least the circumstances must be such that he is 
necessar i ly chargeable with knowledge of them. . . .The 
due-on-sale clause contained in Pa rag raph 8 of the 
First Federal Landing mortgage agreement does not 
specify a time within which First Federal must asser t 
i ts r ight to accelerate payment of the outs tanding 
balance of the mortgage. We hold t ha t , in the absence 
of a specific time, the lender has a reasonable time 
following the act or event by the borrower which 
t r iggers the terms of the clause to exercise its r ights 
the reunder . " 
The Court goes on to say that three months is not 
unreasonable under the circumstances of this case in order to 
exercise a due-on-sale provis ion. Therefore, it is obvious that 
any protracted delay would have been held to have precluded the 
mortgagee from exercising such r i g h t s . 
In the case of Dunham v . Ware Savings Bank, 423 
N.E.2d 998, on page 100, the Massachusetts court s tated 
" In i t i a l l y , we dispose of the p la in t i f f ' s claim that 
the bank waived i ts r ight to accerlate because it did 
not seek to enforce the clause unt i l approximately three 
months had elapsed since the t r ans fe r . The prevai l ing 
rule is tha t under an ord inary acceleration clause 
in a mortgage the obligee has a reasonable time in 
which to elect to declare the indebtedness due. 
Malouff v . Midland Federal Savings & Loan Association, 
sup ra . We do not think that three months is unreason-
able , see id., (one month reasonable , but not one 
y e a r ) , although we note that once the bank knows or 
should have known of the t rans fe r , any delay is at 
i ts p e r i l . " 
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It becomes obvious from these cases t h a t , al though 
they hold with the mortgagee, under the proper set of fac ts , with 
an undue period of time having elapsed from the sale unt i l the 
notice of defaul t , the resul ts would have been different. 
Another d is turb ing fact involved in th is case is tha t 
the defendant , Deseret Federa l , has accepted sufficient payments 
from the plaintiff to put the loan in a current s ta tus at the 
present t ime. This not only enhances the i r equity where the i r 
r i sk of loss is grea t ly reduced, but should estop them from con-
t inuing with the foreclosure. See Christ ie v . Guild, 101 Utah 313, 
121 P.2d 401. 
In a well-reasoned opinion ent i t led Redd v. Western 
Savings & Loan Co., 646 P.2d 761, the Supreme Court upheld the 
due-on-sa le c l ause . However, the Court infers tha t if the defen-
dant had accepted payments , it would have waived i ts cont rac tual 
r i g h t s . This statement is made on page 762: 
"Since February , 1980, the defendant has re turned 
al l payments tendered by pla int i f fs to avoid any 
waiver of i ts cont rac tua l r i g h t s . " 
This case also seems to hold, on page 766, tha t the subsequent 
sa le being made on contract with the t i t le re ta ined by the seller 
would have some significance on the ab i l i ty of the lender to 
accelerate the provisions of the cont rac t . 
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POINT I I ; THE COURT HAD SUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO 
AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES IN BEHALF OF THE 
RESPONDENT. 
This l i t i g a t i o n a r o s e when a p p e l l a n t f i led a Notice 
of Defaul t a g a i n s t r e s p o n d e n t , c l a i m i n g t h a t t he d u e - o n - s a l e p r o -
v i s ion of the T rus t Deed h a d been t r i g g e r e d . This ac t ion was 
t a k e n a f t e r t he p r o p e r t y u s e d a s c o l l a t e r a l was so le ly in the name 
of r e s p o n d e n t b o r r o w e r , a n d p u r s u e d af te r the loan was b r o u g h t 
c u r r e n t . I t i s c e r t a i n l y w i th in the C o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n in a c a s e 
of e q u i t y to a l low counse l fees to p r e v e n t such f o r e c l o s u r e . I t 
would be u n c o n s c i o n a b l e to force r e s p o n d e n t to p a y such e x p e n s e s 
when the fac t s a r e so c l e a r a n d u n e q u i v o c a l in h i s b e h a l f . 
CONCLUSION 
C e r t a i n l y t h i s Court shou ld not a l low a l e n d e r to forego 
ac t ion on a d u e - o n - s a l e p r o v i s i o n for more t h a n s ix y e a r s a f te r 
b e i n g no t i f ied of s a l e . I t would not be e q u i t a b l e to a l low the 
a p p e l l a n t to watch the f l u c t u a t i o n of the pr ime r a t e a n d g a u g e 
i t s a c t i o n s to maximize i t s p ro f i t s wi th t o t a l d i s r e g a r d for the 
r i g h t s or i n t e r e s t s of the b o r r o w e r . 
This Court shou ld p e r m a n e n t l y enjoin a p p e l l a n t from 
c o n t i n u i n g i t s fo rec losure b a s e d upon the s a l e in May, 1979, a n d 
shou ld a w a r d r e s p o n d e n t a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . 
Respect fu l ly submi t t ed t h i s tJ\ d a y of A p r i l , 1986. 
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